Washington in Danger

Jackson held fast to his mountain position until the night of the 11th (August, 1862) when, hearing of the approach of National troops from the Rappahannock, he fell back behind the Rapid Anne. Pope took position along the line of that stream, where he was reinforced by troops from the Carolinas under Generals Burnside and Stevens. The Confederates were now concentrated for a march on Washington, in heavy columns. Halleck, meanwhile, perceiving possible danger to the capital, had issued a positive order to McClellan, on the 3d of August, for the immediate transfer of the Army of the Potomac to the vicinity of Washington. That commander instructed his superior officer that "the true defence of Washington" was "on the banks of the James." The order was repeated with urgency; but it was twenty days after it was first given before the transfer was accomplished.

In the meantime there had been stirring events in the direction of the capital. Alarmed at the force which Lee had concentrated on his front, Pope retired behind the forks of the Rappahannock. Lee pushed forward to that river with heavy columns, and on the 20th and 21st of August, a severe artillery duel was fought above Fredericksburg, for seven or eight miles along that stream. Finding that they could not force a passage of the river, the Confederates took a circuitous route toward the mountains to flank the Nationals, when Pope made skillful movements to thwart them. But danger to the National Capital increased every hour. Troops were coming with tardy pace from the Peninsula; and on the 25th, when those of Franklin, Heintzelman and Porter had arrived, Pope's army, somewhat scattered, numbered about sixty thousand men. On that day, Jackson, leading the great flanking force, crossed the Rappahannock. By a swift march he went over the Bull's Run Mountain at Thoroughfare Gap, and at daylight the next morning he was at Manassas Junction on the railway between the Army of Virginia and the National Capital. Pope took measures for the capture of Jackson or to prevent his uniting with Longstreet, then coming to support him; but the latter event soon occurred at Groveton, not far from the Bull's Run battle-ground. There, on the 29th of August (1862), the combined Confederates fought the whole of Pope's army excepting Banks's troops. The struggle was severe but indecisive. The loss in the battle at Groveton was about seven thousand men on each side.

Not doubting that he would be instantly reinforced by McClellan, who was at Alexandria, Pope prepared to renew the conflict the next morning. He confidently expected rations and forage from Alexandria, for McClellan had been ordered to supply them; but on the morning of the 30th, when it was too late to retreat and perilous to stand still, Pope received an astounding note from General Franklin, written by direction of McClellan, that "rations and forage would be loaded into the available wagons and cars" as soon as he (Pope) should send a cavalry escort for the train! It was impossible. Assured that he would not receive support from McClellan, Pope was compelled to fight under great disadvantages. Deceived by what appeared to be a retreat of Lee's army, he was drawn into an ambuscade on a part of the former battle-ground of Bull's Run, not far from Groveton, and there a most sanguinary conflict ensued. The Nationals were defeated; and flying across Bull's Run to Centreville, they were there reinforced by the troops of Franklin and Sumner. Pope had labored hard under many difficulties; and he complained bitterly of a lack of co-operation with him, in his later struggles, by McClellan and some of his subordinates. After the most strenuous efforts of the President and General Halleck to have the Army of the Potomac join the Army of Virginia in confronting Lee, Pope was joined by only about twenty thousand of the ninety-one thousand who were at Harrison's Landing. McClellan seemed more ready to give advice than to obey orders. "I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future," he wrote to Halleck, "unless I receive authority to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment." And after, by delays, he had thwarted the efforts of the government to get Franklin's corps in a position to give Pope much-needed aid on the 29th, and Halleck had urged him to act promptly in finding out where the enemy was, for he was "tired of guesses," McClellan telegraphed to the President, saying: "I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted. First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the Capital safe."