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The Play of President Pierce for Cuba: Soule

Mr. Marcy, secretary of state, August 16, 1854, addressed Mr. Soule, minister to Spain, a letter stating he was directed by the president "to suggest a particular step from which he anticipates much advantage to the negotiations with which you are charged on the subject of Cuba." Mr. Soule of Louisiana was minister to Spain for that express purpose and was a man of remarkable talents, curtly accomplishments, striking presence and of rare persuasive capacity. His eye and voice were fascinating, and he was well chosen for the work cut out as his task. Mr. Marcy proceeded to make the president's suggestion in these terms: "It seems desirable there should be a full and free interchange of views between yourself, Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Mason, in order to secure a concurrence in reference to the general object." The idea was that the ministers should consult together, compare opinions as to what might be advisable, and adopt measures for perfect concert of action in the negotiations with Madrid. The president had full confidence in Mr. Soule's intelligence, and yet he thought, said Mr. Marcy to him, "that it cannot be otherwise than agreeable to you and to your colleagues in Great Britain and France, to have the consultation suggested, and thus bring your common wisdom and knowledge to bear simultaneously upon the negotiation at Madrid, London and Paris." Whenever the interview took place, Mr. Soule was desired to communicate to the government "the results of opinion or means of action to which you may in common arrive through a trustworthy confidential messenger, who may be able to supply the details not contained in a formal dispatch." The precaution to provide that some things should not be put on paper will be observed as in character with the entire proceedings. In extensive despatches Mr. Marcy had advised Mr. Soule: "It was believed by the president that there was no hope, by pursuing the ordinary course of negotiation, of arriving at such an adjustment of our affairs with Spain as could be satisfactory to this country. If she could be induced to give a fair consideration to our complaints for injuries perpetrated, and offer a full reparation for them, yet the more difficult matter--an arrangement in respect to the future--would still remain to be made," and "preparatory to resorting to an extreme measure, he thought it would be expedient to make a solemn and impressive appeal to Spain, by an extraordinary commission;" and "if, in her infatuation, Spain should determine not to regard it, but persist in maintaining the present order of things, not only the people of this country, but the governments of others, would see, in such a course on the part of the United States, an anxious desire and a settled determination to exhaust all peaceful means for redress and future security."

There is in this unmistakably the contemplation of war with Spain, unless she gave up Cuba peaceably. Mr. Marcy proceeded to assure Mr. Soule "that in considering this measure, it did not occur to the president, or any of his advisers, that the institution of an extraordinary commission in a case so unusual, and of such great importance, could warrant an inference that our minister at Madrid had not faithfully and ably done his duty, and given satisfaction to the government. Such an inference is repelled by the fact that he was to have been included in the commission, and placed at its head, if it could be said to have any gradation."

But, there had interposed events in Spain such that she was in a transition state, and so the conclusion was reached at Washington, "before its administration shall have resumed a stable and tranquil condition, it would not be opportune as to time, or of any practical utility, to press particular demands on the consideration of the Spanish government." The Spanish revolution had changed the aspect of things, and it was more important to look to the future than the past. The president's views were unchanged, of course, but he desired "additional hopes of success in the great objects contemplated," and thought the new government should not be pressed; "but even at this crisis" Mr. Marcy was bound to say, "few subjects of greater moment can be pressed upon it than the management of Cuba. To this subject, as bearing upon the interests of the United States, and in its present condition threatening the peace of two countries, you will direct your particular attention." The process was changed, but the policy was unrelenting. It will be observed that the peace of the two countries was threatened; several back logs were kept in the fireplace! Mr. Marcy gives space to thoughts about the condition of Spain in a semi-confidential way, and adds, "These remarks are intended to apply, not only to the lesser questions between two governments, but equally to the greater and higher ones, more especially what concerns the relation of Cuba to the United States." The president had thought it might be well he should be clothed by Congress "with additional power with reference to our relation with Spain;" this "in anticipation of sundry eventualities which may present themselves in the recess of Congress." It was, however, concluded the better way to defer an "extraordinary commission," and "extraordinary powers" for the president, and shift the scene of activity from Washington. Mr. Soule, under date of Aix-la-Chapelle, Oct. 15, 1854, wrote to Mr. Marcy : I had not been more than two days at the Pyrenees, when I received the despatches numbered 18 and 19, which Colonel Sickles had in charge from you to deliver in my hands. They informed me of the course which it was the wish of the president I should pursue in the ascertainment of the best mode through which could be accomplished the main object of my mission, viz: the acquisition of the island of Cuba from Spain.