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The Crisis in Cuba: Executive

I affirm that the question of the recognition of the existence of a revolutionary government is vested in the Executive. Whether this power is exclusive it is unnecessary to decide, though I shall allude incidentally to this phase. When the senator from Alabama stated that he denied the power of the Executive, unaided by Congressional action, to recognize the belligerency, it seems to me that his statement was unsupported by precedent or reason. I cannot find any other authority for it. True, Mr. President, a joint resolution, signed by the President of the United States, recognizing belligerency, would operate, if not by virtue of the action of Congress, certainly so, because it was approved by the Executive. I do not find it necessary to contend that Congress cannot pass a bill recognizing belligerency over the veto of the Executive. I can find no such instance, however. I trust that no conflict of that nature will ever arise.

What is the effect of a declaration of belligerency? Is it anything, when properly made, to which a nation has a right to take exception? Manifestly not. In such an instance we assert neutrality. The President of the United States issues his proclamation, declaring that this country will stand hands off; that we will not interfere. It is not a proclamation of war, it is a proclamation of peace; it is not an announcement of interference; it is an announcement of non-interference; it is not opening ourselves to the charge that we are attempting to injure a friendly nation, but it means that we have concluded that there are contending parties whose armed conflict is sufficiently important to be dignified by the term war, and that we will remain impartial spectators. But, on the other hand, recognition of the independence of a revolutionary country is often the subject of vigorous protest.

It passes without saying, that no nation is rudely dismembered, save after vigorous contest and exhaustive effort. The history of our country demonstrates that we have never recognized the independence of a state which has successfully revolted without subjecting ourselves to the criticisms of the mother-country. There is much more danger, much more probability of conflict with a foreign power, in consequence of the recognition of the independence of a revolted government, than when we merely recognize belligerency. No nation can be expected to contemplate with satisfaction the loss of her possessions, and, unlike the able senator from Alabama, I regard the power to recognize independence, which he concedes to be in the Executive, as much more important than the authority to recognize belligerency, which he denies to the Executive. Said Secretary Seward, in a letter to Mr. Adams, our minister to England (I Messages and Documents, 1861-62, page 79): "To recognize the independence of a new state, and so favor, possibly determine, its admission into the family of nations, is the highest possible exercise of sovereign power, because it affects in every case the welfare of two nations, and often the peace of the world."

But if it be true that the insurgents in Cuba have the same right to procure arms and supplies under the present condition of affairs, as they would if the United States recognized them as belligerents, where is the vast importance attributed to this recognition? What privileges would they thus obtain? Outside of a certain moral advantage, the sole theoretical benefit would be a curtailment of the rights of Spain. As it is now, the insurgents have no national status, and Spain is not prohibited from coming to our ports and arming her vessels, and she may fit out military expeditions here, or take any steps competent to her in normal times. In the event of recognition Spain would be also liable under our neutrality statute. That is one advantage which would accrue to Cuba in consequence of belligerency. But, practically, what would this amount to? Spain is not engaged in fitting out expeditions in this country. There is no sympathy for her here. She can procure no men to enlist in her cause; she can obtain no aid and comfort in America. She may, like her foes, buy supplies and arms in our markets, but that is her right in any event. Thus it will be seen that but little benefit can follow even effective action for recognition.

What potency accompanies any resolution that we may adopt? We all desire to see Cuba liberated, but how can she achieve her independence except through her own efforts? If our government were not careful in the enforcement of her neutrality laws, perhaps the insurgent cause might advance more rapidly. If these people were more carefully advised there would not, I am persuaded, be serious difficulty in getting much-needed ammunition and other war material, but expeditions cannot be fitted out here, nor can men enlist for hostile service, and arm ships in our waters for warlike enterprise. No one proposes that we shall declare war against Spain, and unless we do so the excited language daily repeated here is not appropriate.