The Land Fight at Santiago: Spain and Cuba

On that morning of the 3d, about an hour after the time for surrendering, Cervera's fleet left the harbor, and went out, as you know, to total annihilation. It was not more than twenty or thirty minutes after it left the mouth of the harbor before, so far as we could hear, the firing had ceased, and 1,700 men were prisoners, 600 were killed and three or four battle-ships and some torpedo-boats were either on the rocks or in the bottom of the sea--a most wonderful victory, never equalled before in naval history, and due mainly to the magnificent marksmanship of our men, who covered the Spanish decks with such a hail of iron that no sailors on earth could stand against it.

Two days after this I saw General Toral, and I was convinced from conversation with him that he was going to surrender. I had no one but myself to take the responsibility, in fact, I did not want anyone else to do it, but while I was convinced myself it was hard to convince others. I knew that we could capture the town at any time, that we had it surrounded so that the garrison could not get away, although on the night of July 2, 2,800 men marched in. I had understood there were 8,000, but when we counted them a few days afterwards there were only 2,800. I knew that if we carried that town by assault, a thousand men at least would be lost to the American army. One thousand American soldiers are a good many to expend in capturing a Spanish town, and I did not propose to do it if I could talk them into a surrender.

General Toral knew just as well as I did that I knew just what he had -- that he was on his last rations, and that nothing but plain rice, that we had his retreat cut off, that we had the town surrounded, that he could not hurt us, while we could bombard him and do some little damage, perhaps, and that it was only a question of a few days.

I found out a few days later what the hitch was which caused the delay, for General Toral had told me that he had been authorized by Blanco, the Captain-General, to enter into negotiations and make terms for surrender. In Cuba, you know, General Blanco was in supreme command. His authority was such that he could even set aside a law of Spain. Knowing that, I felt sure that after very little delay they would surrender. They desired to get permission from the Madrid government to return to Spain. That is what delayed them. Immediately upon receiving the permission to return to Spain they surrendered.

I had in line when the fighting was going on, about 13,000 men -- not more than that at any time. Inside the Spanish trenches there were about 10,000. There were 11,500 surrendered, and I think about 1,500 of them were sick. The disproportion, considering the difference of situation, is not very great. In fact, I think that 10,000 American soldiers could have kept 100,000 Spaniards out, had they been in the same position, although I do not wish to disparage the bravery of the Spanish troops. They are gallant fellows, but they have not the intelligence and do not take the initiative as do the American soldiers; and they have not the bulldog pluck that hangs on day after day.

Toral made the first proposition to surrender. He said if I would let him take his men and such things as they could carry on their persons and on a few pack-mules that they had, and guarantee him safe-conduct to Holguin, which was fifty-two miles away to the north and in the interior, they would march out. I told him, of course, that that was out of the question; that I could not accept any such terms as those, but I would submit it to the President. I did so, and was very promptly informed that only unconditional surrender would be received, but I was at liberty to say to General Toral that if they would surrender they would be carried, at the expense of the United States government, back to Spain. When that proposition was made to him I could see his face lighten up and the faces of his staff, who were there. They were simply delighted. Those men love their country intensely, they had been brought to Cuba against their will, and had stayed there three years, poorly clad, not paid at all, and not well fed, and the prospect of going back to their homes had as much to do with conforming their views to our wishes as anything that was done during the campaign.