The Land Fight at Santiago (Part 3)
On the 29th we had reached the immediate vicinity of the peaks in front of Santiago, about a mile and a half from the city. On the 30th I carefully reconnoitred the ground as much as one could in the dense undergrowth, and determined where I would make my attack, which was simply directed in front, and to make a direct assault. There was no attempt at strategy, and no attempt at turning their flanks. It was simply going straight for them. In that I did not misjudge my men, and that is where I succeeded so well. If we had attempted to flank them out or dig them out by regular parallels and get close to them, my men would have been sick before it could have been accomplished, and the losses would have been many times greater than they were.
The only misfortune, as I judged it, of the first day's fight, but which I have since learned was for the best, was that immediately on our right, and what would be in our rear when we attacked the town, was a little village called El Caney, four miles and a half from Santiago, and whence the best road in the country connected with Santiago. I did not know the exact force there, but it was estimated to be 1,000, and perhaps a little more, and it would, of course, have been very hazardous to have left that force so near in our rear.
Instead of finishing the affair by 9 o'clock, as we expected, it took until 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon before the last shot was fired, and then after a loss of nearly a hundred killed and 250 wounded on our side and the almost total annihilation of the force opposed to us. They had an idea that they would be killed, and when men believe that it is hard to capture them. Just at the close of the battle three or four hundred did attempt to escape, but ran out in front of a brigade that they did not see, and in the course of about three or four hundred yards most of them were dead or mortally wounded, so that probably not more than twenty men on the other side escaped from that battle. It was a most desperate struggle.
Men were killed in the trenches by being knocked on the head with muskets, and two days later I was shown one man with what would be called a tremendous head on him. When the interpreter asked him how that had occurred he doubled up his fist and spoke of the soldier who had hit him, as a black man who had dropped his gun and hit him in the head with his fist. That was pretty close work.
Meanwhile the battle in front of Santiago progressed, with three divisions on our side, one of dismounted cavalry and two of infantry. It was beautifully fought. Every man knew what he had to do, and so did every officer. The orders were that immediately upon being deployed they were to attack. They did it. Every man kept going, and when one's comrade dropped the rest kept going. The result was that in less than two hours the line was taken, and practically that afternoon the battle of Santiago was ended, for those men never advanced beyond that point.
During the night I brought up the soldiers of General Lawton that had been on the right at Caney and put them on the extreme right, where I had intended to have them the day before. Had they been there we should probably have taken the town and have gotten only the men who were there, and not the 12,000 who were far beyond our reach and surrendered a few days later.
On the morning of the 2d a weak attempt was made upon our lines. In that the Spaniards had to expose themselves, while my men were covered. The fight lasted but a little while and they retreated.
On the morning of July 3 I thought we had so much of an advantage that I could notify the enemy, first, that I wanted a surrender and, second, if they declined to surrender that they could have twenty-four hours to get the women and children out of town. Of course, civilized people do not, if they can avoid it, fire on towns filled with women and children if they will come out. The Spanish commander declined very promptly to surrender, but said he would notify the women and children and those who desired to go, but he wanted twenty-four hours more, and said there were a great many people to go out. They began to stream out at once, and for forty-eight hours old men, women and children poured out until it was estimated that at least 20,000 people passed through our lines and out into the woods in the rear. Of course, there was an immense amount of suffering, and numbers died, especially of the old. Fortunately we were enabled to give them some food, enough to sustain life, but at that time, with the Cuban forces that I had, I was issuing daily 45,000 rations. Forty-five thousand people are a good many to feed when you have such fearful roads and food could only be carried on the backs of mules.