Admiral Sampson's Report to the Secretary of the Navy: Infanta Maria Teresa and Gloucester

The remarkably skilful handling and gallant fighting of the Gloucester excited the admiration of every one who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel -- the yacht Corsair -- and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying two miles from the harbor entrance, to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the Pluton and Furor, the Gloucester was slowed, gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed and was able to close to short range, where her fire was accurate, deadly and of great volume. During this fight the Gloucester was under the fire of the Socapa battery. Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago harbor, the careers of the Furor and the Pluton were ended and two-thirds of their people killed. The Furor was beached and sunk in the surf; the Pluton sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle-ships Iowa, Indiana, and the Texas, yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the Gloucester's battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the Gloucester did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the Infanta Maria Teresa.

The special method of escape attempted by the Spaniards -- all steering in the same direction and in formation -- removed all tactical doubts or difficulties, and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately engage and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading ships, which could not immediately work up to their best speed; but they suffered heavily in passing, and the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Oquendo were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement; it was afterwards learned that the Infanta Maria Teresa's fire main had been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish fire. With large columns of smoke rising from the lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the beach -- the Infanta Maria Teresa at about 10:15, at Nima, six and one-half miles from Santiago harbor entrance, and the Almirante Oquendo at about 10:30 a. m., at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.

The cruiser Vizcaya was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the Cristobal Colon had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the leading American ships. The Vizcaya was soon set on fire and at 11:15 she turned in shore and was beached at Aserraderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode. When about ten miles west of Santiago the Indiana had been signalled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Aserraderos the Iowa was signalled to "resume blockading station." The Iowa, assisted by the Ericsson and the Hist, took off the crew of the Vizcaya, while the Harvard and the Gloucester rescued those of the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Almirante Oquendo.

This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded from the burning Spanish vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazine. In addition to this, a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete.