Admiral Sampson's Report to the Secretary of the Navy: Cristobal Colon and Brooklyn

Of the Spanish ships there now remained afloat only the Cristobal Colon -- but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the Vizcaya went ashore, the Colon was about six miles ahead of the Brooklyn and the Oregon, but her spurt was finished, and the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the Brooklyn and the Oregon came the Texas, Vixen and New York. It was evident from the bridge of the New York that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12:50 the Brooklyn and the Oregon opened fire and got her range -- the Oregon's heavy shell striking beyond her -- and at 1:20 she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors, and ran ashore at Rio Tarquino, forty-eight miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the Brooklyn, went on board to receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up on the New York, received his report, and placed the Oregon in charge of the wreck to save her, if possible; and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the Resolute, which had followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose chief-of-staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify. The Cristobal Colon was not injured by our firing and probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her sea-valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the New York bodily upon the beach. The New York's stem was placed against her for that purpose, the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment. She sank in shoal water and may be saved. Had this not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total loss.

I regard this most complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the Cristobal Colon.

It seems eminently proper briefly to describe here the manner in which this was accomplished. The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade -- there being but one entrance, and that a narrow one, and the deep water extending close up to the shore line presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of the entrance. At the time of my arrival before the port, June 1, the moon was at its full, and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any movement outside of the entrance to be detected; but with the waning of the moon and the coming of dark nights, there was opportunity for the enemy to escape, or for his torpedo-boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It was ascertained, with fair conclusiveness, that the Merrimac, so gallantly taken into the channel on June 3, did not obstruct it. I therefore maintained the blockade as follows: To the battle-ships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro -- dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere -- they threw a searchlight beam directly up the channel and held it steadily there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel, for half a mile inside of the entrance, so brilliantly that the movement of the small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the searchlight ship was always a matter of surprise to me, but they never did. Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three picket launches, and, at a little distance farther out, three small picket vessels -- usually converted yachts -- and, when they were available, one or two of our torpedo-boats. With this arrangement there was, at least, a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbor undetected. After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battle-ship was placed alongside the searchlight ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The Massachusetts, which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others, had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that morning. I enclose, for the information of the department, copies of orders and memorandums issued from time to time, relating to the manner of maintaining the blockade.