Public Confidence in Washington and the Army: Gates and Whitemarsh

When full knowledge of the events of Burgoyne's surrender became known, it was perceived that Gates had no use for a large army in the north. The public interest impatiently demanded that he should send a greater part of his Continental troops to assist Washington in reducing Howe to the condition of Burgoyne. But this patriotic course might thwart the ambitious schemes of the commander in the north and his friends, who seemed willing to have the sun of Washington's renown eclipsed by disaster, that Gates's more feeble orb might appear to be the brighter luminary. Washington directed Gates to forward heavy reinforcements as speedily as possible. The latter, with false pretences, held them back. Amazed at this positive disobedience, so nearly resembling the treason of Lee, the commander-in-chief sent his ever trusty aid, colonel Alexander Hamilton, to acquaint Gates, in person, with the urgent necessity of sending forward troops immediately. Gates still hesitated. The acute Hamilton plainly saw the reason, and he used such plain language toward the conspirator, that Gates, startled, sent large reinforcements down the Hudson immediately. Hamilton followed soon afterward, and was amazed to find these troops detained by General Putnam below the Highlands. At Gates's instigation, the veteran, believing he might win personal glory by the expulsion of the British from New York city, had actually advanced with his army as far down as White Plains, on the foolish errand. Acting under the advice of Governor Clinton, Hamilton spoke authoritatively in the name of Washington, and arrested the wild expedition. But these delays had frustrated the well-laid plans of Washington for capturing or expelling the whole British army. At the same time the powerful Gates faction in the Congress had caused legislation in that body which was calculated to dishonor the commander-in-chief and restrain his military operations. They forbade him to detach more than twenty-five hundred men from the Northern Army without first consulting General Gates and Governor Clinton, and so making him subservient to his inferiors in rank. The Adamses and Gerry of Massachusetts, and Marchant of Rhode Island, actually voted for a resolution forbidding Washington to detach any troops from that Department, excepting by consent of Gates and Clinton. The Congress also ordered Gates to "regain the forts and passes on the Hudson," which Washington had already deprived the British of, by pressing Howe so closely that he ordered Sir Henry Clinton, as we have observed, to abandon them and send reinforcements to the Delaware. This afforded Gates an excuse for keeping back the troops which he had sent down the Hudson. So the war was prolonged by a faction.

Howe soon made another effort to gain possession of the Delaware River. He planted five batteries, with an aggregate of thirty pieces of cannon, within five hundred yards of Fort Mifflin. A large floating battery was brought up the river; and on the 10th of November the British opened heavy guns from these, upon the fort. The siege was a fearful one, and continued six days. On the second day, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, the commander of the fort, was wounded and taken over to Fort Mercer, when the leadership devolved first upon Colonel Russell, of Connecticut, and then upon Major Thayer of Rhode Island, who was well supported by Major Fleury, the French engineer. The garrison held out bravely under an incessant cannonade and bombardment. On the 15th, some British vessels with heavy guns, approached near enough for hand-grenades to be thrown from them into the fort. Five ships-of-war took positions to keep off the American flotilla, and to fire a broadside occasionally upon Fort Mifflin. During that day, more than a thousand shot and shell were hurled upon the works on Mud Island, from 12 to 32-pounders; and a storming party were made ready to attack the fort on the morning of the 16th. In the darkness of the preceding evening, Major Thayer sent all of the garrison, excepting forty men, to Fort Mercer, and he, with these, followed at midnight. The fort had become untenable, and was abandoned in time to save the remnant of the garrison, which had lost about two hundred and fifty men, killed or wounded. Washington's army was then encamped at Whitemarsh, in a beautiful valley, about fourteen miles from Philadelphia, where he waited, in much anxiety, for the result of the attack on Fort Mifflin.

Fort Mercer was yet in possession of the Americans. Cornwallis was sent with two thousand men, by way of Byllinge Point, to attack the post. The vigilant Washington immediately sent General Greene, with his division, by way of Burlington, to join some American troops in New Jersey and give battle to the enemy. Greene was accompanied by Lafayette, and expected to be reinforced by troops from the Hudson River. He was disappointed, while Cornwallis was joined by five British battalions from New York. General Greene was compelled to abandon the plan of fighting the invaders, and the commander of Fort Mercer (Colonel Greene), seeing no hope of help, evacuated the works, leaving his artillery as trophies for the enemy. Cornwallis levelled the ramparts of Fort Mercer and returned to Philadelphia, and the American troops in New Jersey crossed the Delaware and joined Washington at Whitemarsh.