Public Confidence in Washington and the Army

A few of the American vessels escaped up the river, in the night, but seventeen of them were abandoned and burned by their crews. The river obstructions and the shore defences were scattered to the waves and winds; and on the 11th of December, Washington broke up his encampment at Whitemarsh and proceeded with his whole force to Valley Forge, about twenty miles northward of Philadelphia. He had been joined by troops from the north; and only a few days before, he had repulsed a British force, fourteen thousand strong, who came out on an intensely cold night (December 4, 1777) to surprise him. There was a sharp fight at Edge Hill; and after threatening the American camp at various points, the British withdrew and returned to Philadelphia. Washington's whole army did not number more than eleven thousand men, of whom only about seven thousand were fit for field duty. He chose Valley Forge as a place for a winter encampment, because it was further from the danger of sudden attacks from the enemy, and where he might more easily protect the Congress at York and his stores at Reading.

Members of Congress and the Pennsylvania Legislature, moved by impulse more than by judgment, had been clamorous for an immediate attack upon the British in Philadelphia, who had strongly fortified every important way of approach to that city. But Washington, sustained by a large majority of his general officers, disregarded all querulous fault-finding. His troops were in great distress, because of a lack of shoes and clothing, when they evacuated Whitemarsh. Many of them made the fatiguing journey to Valley Forge over hard frozen ground and through snow, barefooted, leaving blood spots on the white carpet trodden by their lacerated feet. Upon the slopes of a narrow valley on the borders of the winding Susquehanna, they were encamped with no shelter but rude log-huts, during a very severe winter. There the little army shivered with cold and almost starved with hunger, while the British army were indulging in comforts and luxuries in a large city. Yet the patriotism of that republican army was not cooled, nor their aspirations for liberty starved; nor did the commander-in-chief suffer a doubt of success to cloud his spirits, for he knew the cause to be a righteous one, and believed that God would give final victory to the oppressed. In all the world's history, we have no record of purer devotion, holier sincerity or more pious self-sacrifice, than was exhibited in the camp of Washington during the winter of 1777 and 1778. At the same time the British army were as much weakend by indulgence as were the republican troops by privations. Profligacy begat disease, crime, and insubordination. The evil effects of these led Dr. Franklin to say: "Howe did not take Philadelphia-Philadelphia took Howe."

It was during that winter that the amusing circumstance occurred which drew from the pen of Francis Hopkinson his famous satirical poem entitled "The Battle of the Kegs." In January (1778), while the channel of the Delaware was yet free of ice, some Whigs at Bordentown sent floating down the river a few kegs filled with gunpowder, and so arranged with machinery, that on rubbing against an object, they would explode. It was hoped that some of these torpedoes, touching a British vessel, might explode and sink it. One of them, touching some floating ice in front of the city, blew up, and produced intense alarm. Hopkinson, in his satire, say:

For twenty-four hours afterward, not a chip or stick could float down the stream without being fired at by musket or cannon by the British:

At that time occurred that episode in our history known as "Conway's Cabal"- a conspiracy to ruin the reputation of Washington, and to make Gates the commander-in-chief of the armies, of which intimations have been given in this work from time to time. The conspirators labored in secret, by means of forged and anonymous letters, and slanderous reports, to weaken the public confidence in Washington as a leader. Failing to effect their object by these means (for he was every day rising higher and higher in public esteem), it was determined to abridge his influence and extend that of Gates, by creating a new Board of War, with the latter officer as president. This was effected late in November, 1777. The Board was invested with large powers, and by delegated authority, assumed the control of military affairs, which properly belonged to the province of the commander-in-chief. It was evident that the Congress intended to make Gates the master-spirit of the war, for, by a resolution, that body instructed their president to inform the general of his appointment to an office "upon the right execution of which the success of the American cause does eminently depend," and that it was the "intention of Congress to continue his rank as major-general in the army, and that he officiate at the Board, or in the field, as occasion may require." His partisans in the Congress hastened to assure him that he would soon be the virtual commander-in-chief.