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The Forces Now Engaged in Cuba
The Conduct of the War--Spanish Force Almost 200,000 Armed Men--65,000 Cubans in Arms, but Poorly Armed--Cavalry a Most Important Factor--Sanitary Regulations Lessen Spanish Loss by Sickness--Opinions of Experts--Suggestions of Strategy--Statistics of the Population of Combatants.--Women in the Army for Protection.
The Spanish army in Cuba, at the beginning of this war, numbered 17,000, and amounted, with the reinforcements, Jan. 1, 1896, to 119,000. Since that date there have been large accessions, so that taking account of losses there are, of Spanish regulars at the seat of war, not less than 130,000. There is to be added 63,000 volunteers guarding the various cities, and with the military police and the navy, the Spanish force pressing upon Cuba exceeds considerably 200,000 armed men.
The resources of Spain in population are: Spain's total population 18,000,000 Number having no profession, of which 6,764,406 are females and 1,963,113 are males 8,727,519 Men engaged in agriculture 4,033,391 Women engaged in agriculture 828,531 The industrial census is insignificant compared to the agricultural. Public office-holders 97,257 Prisoners 64,000 Professors and school-teachers (male) 24,642 Professors and school-teachers (female) 14,490 People attending school (male) 1,009,810 People attending school (female) 719,100 Physicians 20,474 Lady Physicians 78 Literary writers (male) 1,171 Literary writers (female) 74 Actors and actresses 3,497 Servants (male) 89,958 Servants (female) 319,956 Professional beggars (male) 39,279 Professional beggars (female) 51,946 Priests and friars 43,528 Nuns 28,549 Spaniards who read and write (male) 3,417,855 Spaniards who read and write (female) 2,686,615 6,104,470 The population of Cuba is between 1,600,000 and 1,700,000, and there are not less than 50,000 men serving the Cuban cause in the field, and they claim 65,000, an enormous proportion of the available population. A Spanish military expert in a Madrid journal, has given a very interesting and generally accurate, though manifestly prejudiced, account of the character of the war. He says:
Had we in Cuba a large force of cavalry when the revolution started, things would have taken another turn. It is to be regretted that nothing has been done to remedy this defect.
What are the tactics employed in the present war? Is there anything new about them, anything extraordinary? Not a thing.
In this, as in the last war, the only means of action is the horse. They ride incessantly here and there, and when their horses are tired, they seize any they come across. They frequently rest during the day, and march at night, in as light order as possible, carrying only a hammock, a piece of oilcloth, cartridges, machete and rifle. They live by marauding. The country people feed them, and help them so far as they can, and where these insurgents don't find sympathy, the machete, the torch and the rope are good arguments. In the woods they find good shelter, places for storage and for hospitals. They are divided in groups, more or less numerous, to which they give the pompous names of regiments and brigades, and they never accept fight unless their number is far superior to that of our troops. They place themselves in ambush, selecting narrow passages in the woods, fords and lagoons. They always run after firing, and if pursued, they leave a small body charged with firing on their pursuers, while the main body advances rapidly and then stops, and, by circling around, get to the rear of our troops and harrass them. When they go a long distance, they divide into small parties, make the journey at night in the woods, and then the several groups assemble, until necessity compels them to part again, and meet anew on a preconcerted spot. Their infantry is always in loose order, hiding among the bushes, and always protected by the cavalry. At times a group separates from the main body, the mission being to attract the attention of the government troops, while the main body charges "al machete." Such are the insurgents of Cuba, and their ways of fighting. Let us, the expert says, consider the best means of being rid of them, and he makes these propositions, showing the nature of the war raging. 1st. Deprive them of mobility by seizing their horses, and then prevent them from getting others. 2d. Deprive them of their resources by destroying all the fruit trees, and killing all the cattle. 3d. To end the espionage, concentrate the population of the country, and punish severely those who serve the insurgents as spies, messengers or correspondents. 4th. See that they do not receive munitions of war or provisions, by watching closely the coast and the environments of the cities, especially the points near railroads. 5th. Divide and demoralize them, so far as possible, with a vigorous and constant persecution, especially with calvary and infantry, mounted temporarily on horses. 6th. Prevent them from having any advantage in combats, by suppressing all detachments not of absolute necessity, to give the columns freedom of play, and in case the rebels divide into parties, in like manner divide the troops to pursue them. 7th. Stop their tactics of ambush and their false retreats, by means of constant flanks, either double or simple, and do not pursue them without echeloned reserves. 8th. Prevent them from passing freely from one province to another by use of long lines of troops, duly garrisoned and fortified, and with easy means of communication established in all of the largest part of its length. 9th. Prevent them from surrendering and then returning to the field of war again. 10th. To demoralize the insurgents, make a point of capturing their chiefs and their confederates, who, while not in the fighting ranks, are ready to help them whenever the opportunity occurs.
The final recommendations of this writer are to conduct operations with secrecy, to carry on correspondence in cipher, with the keys often changed; to forbid newspaper correspondents to be with troops, and to take possession of all carrier pigeons; and he says: "It must not be forgotten that the organization of a good body of guides and confidents, remunerated liberally and with guaranty of secrecy, is indispensable in all wars, and in this of Cuba more especially." There arrived in Cuba from Spain, during the war from 1868 to 1878, 166,228 soldiers. In 1869, 29,717 arrived; in 1875, 26,401; in 1876 there were 36,355 arrivals. The whole number were not in the Island at one time. The losses in the field and by sickness were large, and also the returns to Spain on the expiration of service.
The following figures are official, and the terrible showing is made that out of 90,245 Spanish soldiers in Cuba, in 1877, there were 17,677 deaths. Died. Per cent. In 1869, of 35,570 5,504 14.56 In 1870, of 47,242 9,395 14.82 In 1871, of 55,357 6,574 13.61 In 1872, of 58,708 7,780 14.56 In 1873, of 52,500 5,902 13.00 In 1874, of 62,572 5,923 18.22 In 1875, of 63,212 6,361 13.60 In 1876, of 78,099 8,482 14.44 In 1877, of 90,245 17,677 17.40 In 1878, of 81,700 7,500 10.89 The yellow fever was especially violent in 1877, as will be remembered, and broke out in the United States the following year. The Spaniards claim that they have so improved the sanitary state of the army that they lose fewer men now with 130,000 men on the rolls than they did in the former was with one-third that number; that is, they lose now four to five per cent., when in former years the loss was near twenty per cent., and they give these figures. The dead by actions of war in the previous war was 8 1/2 per cent.; the sick 9 1/2 per cent.
Of the infantry and cavalry 1,017 officers perished, and other arms of the war, 250.
The marine infantry had 3,240 loss, crews of warships, 1,758, and volunteers, 5,000.
The losses of officers in relation to the troops was 5 per cent. in actions of war, and 12.3 per cent. in sickness.