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Outline History of Cuba from May, 1896, to January, 1897: Cuban

The idle talk caused by the President's respectful reference to the alleged autonomy of Cuba in his message is disposed by Senor Palma in these words: Autonomy would mean that the Cuban people will make their own laws, appoint all of their public officers, except the Governor-General, and attend to the local affairs with entire independence, without, of course, interference by the metropolis. What, then, would be left to Spain, since between her and Cuba there is no commercial intercourse of any kind? Spain is not, and cannot be, a market for Cuban products, and is moreover unable to provide Cuba with the articles in need by the latter. The natural market for the Cuban products is the United States, from which in exchange Cuba buys with great advantage, flour, provisions, machinery, etc. What, then, I repeat, is left to Spain but the big debt incurred by her, without the consent and against the will of the Cuban people? We perfectly understand the autonomy of Canada as a colony of Great Britain. The two countries are closely connected with each other by the most powerful ties-the mutual interest of a reciprocal commerce. The Constitutional question of the comparative powers of Congress and the President in recognition of new nations is not of applicable importance to the Cuban questions. The discussion may be instructive, and prepare the way for the enlightened action of the incoming administration. Considering the summary of Secretary of State Olney, we remark the force and accuracy of it. The Secretary says:

From every accessible indication, it is clear that the present rebellion is on a far more formidable scale, as to numbers, intelligence, and representative features, than any of the preceding revolts of this century; that the corresponding effort of Spain for its repression has been enormously augmented; and that, despite the constant influx of fresh armies and material of war from the metropolis, the rebellion, after nearly two years of successful resistance, appears to-day to be in a position to prolong indefinitely the contest on its present lines.

There will speedily be developments in Pinar del Rio that will show whether the force of the insurgents has been exaggerated in the general acceptance; and if Gomez is at the head of the army he has been occupied with so long, he must hasten to meet Weyler, who claims to have conquered the West End, and is certain, if he can make a plausible show of pacification there, to march eastward with his whole available force. Here we have the true test of the strength of the Cuban cause. Spain has done her utmost, as she is situated, with a rebellion on her hands in the Philippine Islands; and if the army and navy in and around Cuba cannot suppress the rebellion, it must succeed. Gomez is an old man, and the brunt of battle had fallen to the fortune of Maceo for six months before he was killed, but the imputation that Gomez is disheartened or disloyal is a story that accords with the climate, prepared to arouse Cuban suspicion and jealousy. Now is the campaigning time, and Weyler means business in the field. This is the critical struggle. If the insurgents hold their own until June, they must unquestionably win; and unless torn by factions and jealous incompetents, they will do that. It is a true case of "freedom's battle, once begun, bequeathed from bleeding sire to son, though baffled oft, is always won." There is no reason to conclude that the insurgents will not be able, in the Middle and Eastern Provinces, to protract the war indefinitely--a state of things that will force the recognition of independence. The United States will be constrained, on the precise grounds stated by Secretary Olney, to inform the Spaniards that our good offices in relation to Cuba will be tendered in 1897, as they were by President Grant in 1869--for the reasons then stated by Secretary Fish, and respectfully considered by General Prim, and must now be accepted. It is absurd to say, in the face of the civilized world, that the great American power has no interest in the great American Island. We have material interests there of great proportions, and the right to interpose to check a savage warfare that the Christian nations of Europe have, but do not exercise, at Constantinople. The cause of Cuba is not best served by those who are most forward and loud. We should tender our good offices to Spain, and relieve her from the embrace of death in which she is entangled; but we should do it decently and in order, for her sake as well as Cuba's. Our responsibilities are so clear, and the situation so grave, and our power so compelling, we should disregard all frivolous fabrications intended to precipitate our action as unworthy the cause abused, and proceed with the dignity becoming the predominant power of the American hemisphere to Americanize American islands.