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Latest News from the Seat of War: Weyler

There are two recent Havana despatches that may mean something out of the common, and relieve the dull and dreary round of labored bulletins and lively fiction. One is that General Pando has delivered the command of the province of Santa Clara to General Pri, and is going back to Spain. The other point is that General Weyler is making ready to leave Havana and do something himself. He ought to be ready for a start by this time. General Pando is said to be a man of whom Weyler is jealous, and, therefore, his absence from the scene would be welcome, and a movement of Weyler in the field would probably be coincident with the departure of the most conspicuous of the lieutenant-generals--who was not, it is said, allowed the troops he needed, because he, being a fighting man, might do something conspicuous, and make trouble for his superior officer. If Weyler goes out it will, of course, signify that he has made ready for a striking movement, and it could hardly be anything else than a drive at Maceo in overwhelming force, and with a quick step unprecedented on the side of the government.

That Weyler may be up to some desperate work before acknowledging himself powerless through the rainy season would be in character. Among the interesting things he said to the writer, however, was that he did not mean to regard military operations as impracticable during the wet weather. That he will have to take some personal risk in the field is certain, but there is something of that every day in the palace and on the streets of Havana. If Maceo's troopers knew he was in their vicinity, they would, no doubt, however he might be guarded, try a machete charge, and the glory of getting at him with a big knife would be very attractive. The greatest danger of the general would probably be from sharp-shooters. Rifles are of such long range now that in the hands of experts they are deadly far beyond the records on battlefields up to the day of the latest improvements in arms of precision. An officer is not safe where a hostile rifleman can make out his uniform with a field glass. The Cubans tell of a sharp-shooter with Maceo, who, two months ago, had killed seven Spanish officers, and they managed to keep him well supplied with cartridges! The fall of Spanish officers in numbers out of numerical proportion to the number of private soldiers killed, is frequently a feature of the reports, through it may be that one reason is the death of an important man cannot be concealed.

The recently reported heavy fighting in the west between Spanish columns and detachments from Maceo's command have, no doubt, some foundation, but there is as little question the details had been exaggerated. The reports of superhuman bravery on both sides are uncommonly copious and urgent just now, and remind us of the like literary enthusiasms in the early skirmishes of our civil war. After we had heard from the insurgents about their superb achievements, carrying everything before them, annihilating regiment after regiment, the Spaniards captured one of Maceo's forts, and we read of the "storming of Cacarajicara," in the western Cuban mountains, and there was a march "up heights under fire," and this is done by the very Inclan, the Spaniard whose column was several times destroyed in telegrams by way of Key West. A countryman is said to have told the location of Maceo's camp. As it has been for a month within fifteen miles of the Spanish trocha, there should not have been protracted perplexity in finding it. A movement was made, and the troops pushed "forward through a scattering fire from the ambushed rebels, until they reached a pocket in the road, where a town showed and the fortifications above. The firing was now general all along the line. Darkness found the troops in this position. They were kept awake all night under constant fire, with no food or drink. At the first sight of dawn the Spanish general ordered the guns to the front, to attack the intrenchments. The insurgents made an assault upon the artillery men with their machetes, but were "driven back forty feet from the cannon by a wall of troops. A tall, bearded man, stick in hand, urged the rebels to fall on the Spaniards, but they refused, and retreated. A bayonet charge was then ordered, and the soldiers patriotically rushed into the ditch, driving out the rebels. One of those who defended the fort, and fled with the others, was a woman." The return march, which was made immediately, "was very difficult, the enemy being scattered all through the hills, and firing from every point. The progress was slow, on account of the wounded soldiers."

Now one is called upon to have misgiving whether this was a triumphal way of returning from a conquest. Suarez Inclan made an address, thanking his soldiers for their valor, which, he said, "deserved a place in the best pages of Spanish history." He said:

The enemy was concentrated in the thick woods and high hills, and the road was well fortified with trenches at different points. Our position was most difficult.

With all these obstacles, with the superior forces united, trying to defeat and destroy us, half a brigade, formed of soldiers of the San Fernando and Baleares battalions and a section of the Fifth Mountain artillery, showed true heroism, and were ready to conquer or die for their country. They proved able to face and beat the enemy that tried to surround us in the pass of Cacarajicara on our return.

I was much pleased with the spirit of sacrifice under severe discipline. My men were under furious fire in the attacks and in marching, but our efforts were crowned with victory, and the efforts of Maceo's forces, the most determined of the insurrection, were foiled. Those of Socarras gave way, leaving us a position that might have been impregnable. We did not cede a foot, though Quintin Bandera attacked us at night and endeavored to recapture the hill.

Maceo's big forces also tried for six hours to harrass our rear guard, endeavoring to make disorder in the column, while Pilar Rojas attacked the head and left flank. The fortifications were razed, and Socarras and Pilar Rojas were wounded. Hundreds more are dead and wounded. It was not possible for us to escape serious losses. We made a glorious sacrifice for our country. There is an exactness in this that arouses suspicion. What was the march made for if not to hold the ground? Why is stress placed upon the furious efforts of the rebels to destroy the Spaniards? The rebels are really inadvertently credited with taking the offensive. It is vague to say hundreds of rebels were dead and wounded. It is not giving much information to say that fortifications were razed. "Serious losses," confessed in an affair where escape from a bad position was regarded as a victory, means much. This amounts to a Spanish official report that Maceo is well fortified, and is not troubled at all about the trocha.

The despatch by James Creelman, of May 6th, via Key West, says the battle in the mountain at Cacarajicara was a Spanish defeat; but Maceo was not there, being six miles away, looking for another attack. The fighting was severe, and sixteen wounded officers have reached Havana. This latest from this correspondent is: "Gen. Weyler is desperate, and insists that Gen. Maceo must attack the trocha whether he wants to or not. Otherwise what is the use of having a trocha at all? "Gen. Maceo intends to remain in the hills so that when the rains come the Spanish in the low country will be washed out. His position is defended on all sides by well-built breastworks. "The military situation in the Island is this: Maceo commands in the west, Garcia in the east and Gomez in the middle, with authority over all. "Gomez is in a position to go to the support of either his eastern or western generals or to have them come to him.", Concerning the jealousies it is claimed exist among Spanish officers, preventing full and energetic employment of the troops, Captain-General Weyler has been reported to have said that it spoiled a Spanish officer in Cuba; if he reached rank above a colonelcy, he wanted a column to handle for his own convenience, and grew careless about obeying orders. A few weeks after Weyler's arrival there were statements current in Havana to the effect that several prominent officers were to be sent home. Particulars were given in the case of General Canalles, and Weyler was charged with saying of him that he "had no head" and couldn't be useful--more than that he was a devoted friend of Martinez Campos, and therefore under suspicion of unfaithfulness to the new administration.

He had a high reputation as a fighting man. The Cubans were excited over the Canalles stories and, as the general was about to sail, I called upon him and had a frank and a pleasant talk through an interpreter. I found the redoubtable general a middle-aged man, very bald and thin, and troubled with some nervous affection--and he all over looked the old campaigner. He was just taking leave and, asked if he was going away for personal or public reasons, he said he "was called to Spain by ill health and personal misfortune," and his shaky, physical condition was plain enough. It would certainly have been a personal hardship and danger, even if practicable, for him to remain in the field; and a death had occurred in his family that deranged his home affairs and demanded his presence. He had not been removed from his command on account of differences with the captain-general, but he had been identified with the policy and the fortunes of Martinez Campos. He was an Asturian, and that meant he had no politics, but his sword was ever ready in the service of his queen and country. When an Asturian got his orders he asked no questions; and as he turned away to take the ship, that hour sailing for home, he gave me a cordial invitation, if I ever found myself in Spain, to call upon him at his home in Cordova.

This incident seems worth relating here, to show that at times the information in circulation about the relation of the captain-general and his subordinates may be in part erroneous. There is no doubt about it, however, that General Weyler's plans of campaign, and especially his attempted quick, bold strokes, have been embarrassed and thwarted by the habit of the officers of not getting their columns into motion on time and pressing to the mark with the alertness and perseverance that the profession of soldiers demands. We have two stories of personal difficulties--one that did not reach the point of assault with General Pando, who has been spoken of as the probable successor of Weyler when again the head of a commander-in-chief on the Island is demanded in Spain by those politicians who make a business of fault-finding, and do not feel happy until they are furious.