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English Failure in the West Indies: Mexico
The condition of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico is of deeper import, and more immediate bearing upon the present interest and future prospects of our Union. The correspondence herewith transmitted will show how earnestly it has engaged the attention of the government. The invasion of both those islands by the united forces of Mexico and Colombia, is avowedly among the objects matured by the belligerent states at Panama. The convulsions to which, from the peculiar compositions of their population, they would be liable in the event of such an invasion, and the danger therefrom resulting of their falling, ultimately, into the hands of some European power other than Spain, will not admit of our looking at the consequences, to which the Congress of Panama may lead, with indifference. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon this topic, or to say, more than all, our efforts in reference to this interest will be to preserve the existing state of things.
The italicized lines show the tender places in the public mind of that time. In a volume, "Cuba and the Cubans," heretofore quoted, pleading the cause of Cuba, and giving in historic form the grievances her people held against Spain, and glimpses of destiny, we read:
It is certain that the government of the United States did not hesitate to sympathize with the Greeks in their struggle for liberty, and were only prevented by a constitutional objection from granting them substantial national aid. To preserve a settled state of things, the United States, as has been shown, promptly interfered to prevent the invasion of Cuba by Mexico and Colombo. How far the same government ought now to interfere, again to preserve a settled state of things, the United States, as has been shown, promptly interfered to prevent the invasion of Cuba by Mexico and Colombo. How far the same government ought now to interfere, again to preserve things from change, or how far it ought to forward the change, it is not necessary to discuss here.
Spain is too weak much longer to hold her Cuban possessions. It needs but to strike the blow, and independence is achieved to the Island. In this instance the first step is emphatically half the journey, and that step will not long be delayed.
Cuba has the power, as well as the will and wisdom, to be free. It cannot be kept forever in bonds, endowed as she is with a population of 1,200,000; with a revenue of $20,000,000; with the intercourse and light attending $60,000,000 of outward and inward trade; with a territory equal to that of the larger states; with a soil teeming with the choicest productions; with forests of the most precious woods; with magnificent and commanding harbors; with an unmatched position as the warder of the Mexican Gulf, and the guardian of the communication with the Pacific; Cuba, the Queen of the American Islands, will not consent always to remain a manacled slave; and when the chains are to break, the United States can no more say, "Cuba is naught to us," than Cuba can detach herself from her anchorage in her portals of the American sea, or her sentinelship over against the entrance of the thousand-armed Mississippi. Then arises the question, what is to become of Cuba? She will remain independent; she will come under the protection of England, or she will form one of the confederated United States.
So far as the interests of Cuba are concerned, a connection with England of the advantageous character which that country would inevitably grant to the Island, or annexation to the United States, would be more for its welfare and prosperity, than for her to maintain the position of solitary independence. It is rational, then, to suppose she would adopt one of the two remaining positions.
That Cuba should ever fall under the power or influence of England is a thing simply out of the question. The United States cannot permit any European power to erect a Gibraltar that will command both north and south, and which can at any moment cut in two the trade between the Gulf and Atlantic states, and break up at pleasure the sea communication between New Orleans and New York. In a military point of view, Cuba locks up in a closed ring the whole sweep of the Mexican Gulf. Its 700 miles of coast is one mighty fortress; each one of its hundred hill-crowned bays is a haven of shelter to an entire navy, and an outpost to sentinel every movement of offense, and to bar out every act of hostile import.
Standing like a warder in the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico, yet stretching far to the east, so as to overlook and intercept any unfriendly demonstration to either of the great thoroughfares of South America or the Pacific, it is in a position to overawe the adjacent islands, and watch and defend all the outside approaches to the Isthmus routes to the Pacific, while it guards the portals of the vast inland sea, the reservoir of the Mexican and Mississippi trade, the rendevouz of California transit, and, what has not yet been duly heeded, the outlet of a new-born mineral wealth, which is yet to control the mineral markets of Christendom.
In short, it makes a complete bulwark of the Mexican Gulf. This is all true now, except the non-fulfilment of the prophecy of speedy release--which was written half a century ago--from the yoke of Spain, and there has been the immense change of the abolishment of slavery in the United States and Cuba, perfecting the preparations for the annexation of Cuba on the lines of liberty.
The testimony of the English historian, that his countrymen are not competent to take care of Cuba, is important and pertinent, and will be more and more seriously regarded. The latest thing is a league of the West Indies with European protection, but the Island has a nobler destiny, and what it is any atlas of the Americas displays.
Chapter XIII. The City Of Havana.