The Story of Cuba

“The Story of Cuba is a tragedy.” Murat Halstead wrote it while the insurrection was still burning — four centuries of Spanish rule, the sugar and slave economy, Weyler’s camps, and an America deciding whether to intervene.

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Chapter XVI: Spanish

He was in the field with several columns to attack the Cubans near Bayamo and left Manzanillo with 1,500 men. General Lachambre, with about the same number, left Bayamo, and General Valdes was moving from the North with 2,000 men. The Spanish pursued the usual course of operating in detachments--a policy dictated by bad roads, and the cloudy state of the Cuban forces-who are like a mist in the woods and quick to develop a storm.

The Cubans got together nearly 3,000 men in a position to prevent the union of the gathering Spaniards and to strike them separately--a scheme that Spanish strategy invited. Campos had the Isabella, the Catholic Battalion, three companies of the Sixth Peninsular Battalion, one company of engineers and two companies of mounted guerillas. The insurgents were drawn up on a stock farm and strongly posted. There was some uncertainty as to the guide of the captain-general, an old negro, and his column changed its course-it is not certain through advices or accident-avoiding the ambuscade arranged for the general's column, the purpose being to crush him with a machete charge. The insurgents did not get the Spaniards as they, wanted them, and then mistook the formation of the column, which was advancing with twenty-five explorers leading, then General Santocildes with 500 men, then Campos, and then a strong rear guard.

The insurgents mistook the immediate command of Santocildes, who closely followed the pioneers, for that of Campos, the centre of the column which they meant to assail first, and then to strike the rear guard. The fight was partially on wooded hills and a long and bloody affair. The firing was sharp on both sides, and in the midst of a Spanish charge General Santocildes was killed, and the heel of Campos' boot was torn by a bullet. The keen eyes of Maceo, who was in command of the rebel cavalry, perceived from the commotion that some important Spanish officer had fallen, and was encouraged to make enthusiastic efforts to win decisively. Campos at last formed with his whole force a hollow square, and the horses and mules killed and the wagons were used as breastworks. In this formation the struggle went on several hours with varying fortunes, Campos personally directing the defense and constantly exposed to the deadly aim of swarms of sharpshooters. The insurgents tried early on this field their favorite stroke at the baggage train, with the hope of getting ammunition. They are fond of attacking the vanguard of the Spanish force in a spirited way, making a real assault, but not in full force, while the main body moves on the flank, eluding observation if possible, and when there is the greatest possible diversion, making a grand rush upon the rear guard, counting it the greatest success to capture ammunition. Maceo tried this at Bayamo, and recently repeated the operation at Pinar del Rio, avoiding the main body of his enemy and going for the cartridges. At Bayamo the rear guard fought its way to the main body, and completed the Spanish square. The generalship of Campos on this critical occasion has been highly commended. The position which he assumed and his personal presence prevented a rout, and the Spaniards, finding themselves able to hold their ground, grew composed, and were, late in the afternoon, put in motion toward Bayamo. The insurgents made gallant efforts to break the Spanish formation, and poured a heavy fire into them on their right flank as they left the field, keeping it up until some large buildings sheltered the beaten column of the captain-general, and late in the evening the combat ceased. The Spaniards were this day severely shaken and their losses heavy. The rebels claimed to have found thirteen Spanish officers killed. The Cubans had two colonels, Goulet and Machedo, killed, and Colonel Gongora wounded. The Spanish loss is not known, for their official reports are rarely complete, and usually highly colored. Several of the staff of General Santocildes were killed and wounded; and the Cubans, admitting fifty killed and wounded, claim that 300 Spaniards fell dead or disabled.

We have followed the Cuban account of this action closely. The Spanish story does not give Campos as much credit as he gets from the Cubans, but distinguishes General Santocildes as the real hero of the day. The Spaniards say:

On the 12th of July, Martinez Campos left Manzanillo for Bayamo with an escort of 400, and, while on the road, other troops joined Campos, forming a column I,550 strong, at Veguitas. Campos proceeded with his escort toward Barrancas, at 4 O'clock the following morning, and instructed General Santocildes to leave for Bueycito with 1,150 men. Santocildes did so, and going faster than Campos, and following the same road, he almost overtook him, when Campos sent back one of his aides to remind Santocildes that he should march toward Bueycito. This happened for a second time, and then Santocildes advanced to meet the general, and said he had not yet found a certain road he preferred to take. This was a good excuse; Campos evidently wanted to go alone, while Santocildes would neither allow that, or openly disobey his instructions; he knew there was danger. They had been riding together for a short time, when Maceo's vanguard opened fire.

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