The Victory at Trenton: Ferry and Bristol
ON the twenty-fifth day of December, 1776, the regiments of Anspach, Knyphausen, and Rahl, with fifty chasseurs and twenty light dragoons, making a total effective force of not quite fifteen hundred and fifty men, constituted the garrison at Trenton. The command had six pieces of artillery, including two in front of Colonel Rahl's quarters; but, contrary to the previous advice of Colonel Donop, there were neither field-works nor defence of any kind before the ferry or at any of the approaches to the town. One such work on the summit, at the fork of King and Queen's Streets, and one on Front Street, would have seriously endangered the American movement, especially under the circumstances of severe weather, which almost disarmed the assailants. It is well known that rumors of an impending offensive return by Washington had reached Colonel Rahl, and that a small picket-guard had been stationed on the old Pennington road, half a mile beyond the head of King Street, and another was in position, equally advanced, upon the river road leading to the next upper, or McConkey's Ferry, past the houses of Rutherford and General Dickinson.
It was Christmas day, a holiday in great favor with the troops which composed the garrison. It is profitless for the author's purpose to enter into details of the manner in which that garrison observed that holiday and spent the night which closed its enjoyment. It is enough to state that military negligence was absolute, and that it cost the commander his life. That negligence lasted through the night, and prevailed up to eight o'clock in the morning. It appears that the usual morning parade routine had been observed, and the men had returned to their barracks. These barracks, now cleft by a street, were still standing in 1875, and showed that they afforded a good defensive position, if promptly occupied and firmly held. The disposition of the American army for the attack was eminently bold and judicious. Griffin was expected still to occupy the attention of Donop, as if the demonstrations across the river were but the faverish action of local militia. A small centre column, under General James Ewing, of Pennsylvania, whose brigade reported but five hundred and forty-seven rank and file for duty, was to cross just below Trenton, to occupy the bridge across the Assanpink, and thus sever communication with Donop's corps at Bordentown. Still farther down the river, as a constraint upon the possible movement of that corps to the support of Colonel Rahl, the right wing under Colonel John Cadwallader, not yet promoted, was ordered to cross at Bristol, below Bordentown, with view to a direct attack upon Donop from the south, and thus co-operate with the militia in that quarter. General Washington reserved for himself the conduct of the left wing, consisting of twentyfour hundred men, which was to cross nine miles above Trenton, at McConkey's Ferry. Learning that Maidenhead was almost without garrison, except a troop of dragoons, it was the purpose of the American commander also to include that sub-post within his raid.
It was also expected that General Putnam would cross from Philadelphia early on the twenty-sixth, with at least a thousand men. The plan embraced the entire deliverance of the left bank of the Delaware.
The right wing landed a portion of its troops, but, on account of the ice, could not land the artillery, and returned to Bristol. Cadwallader expressed his great regret in his report to Washington, remarking, "I imagine the badness of the night must have prevented you from passing over as you intended."
It was not until four o'clock that Cadwallader succeeded in regaining Bristol; and Moylan, who then started to join Washington, found the storm so violent that he abandoned his purpose, believing that that officer could not possibly effect a crossing. The centre column failed to effect a landing for the same reason.
The left wing of the army under Washington, accompanied by Greene and Sullivan as division commanders, formed evening parade under cover of the high ground just back of McConkey's Ferry, now known as Taylorville. It was designed to move as soon as darkness set in, so as to complete the crossing at midnight, and enter Trenton as early as five o'clock on the morning of the twenty-sixth.
It was such a night as cost Montgomery and Arnold their fearful experience under the rock of Quebec. It was cold, snowy, and tempestuous. A few days of milder weather had opened the ice; now it was again rapidly freezing, checking the current and skirting the shore.