The Siege of Vicksburg: Grand Gulf and Jackson

Grant arrived and took command of the expedition on January 30, 1863. The first plan of operations adopted was to dig a canal across the neck of land made by a wide bend in the river at Vicksburg, with the hope that the Mississippi would take this new course and abandon the city. Two months were spent on this, yet a rise in the river rendered the labor unavailing, by overflowing all the surrounding space. Then strenuous efforts were made to transport the fleet and army below Vicksburg by way of the bayous and larger streams that bordered the river. Efforts of this kind were made both east and west of the river, but in both cases without success. The surrounding country meanwhile was so overflowed and marshy as to interfere greatly with land-operations. It was next determined to run the batteries with the fleet. The night of the 16th of April was fixed for this exploit. It was achieved with much greater success than had been expected. Several of the vessels were wrecked, but the great bulk of the fleet passed in safety. A land-force had been sent down west of the river, to meet the vessels. The next project was to attack the fortifications at Grand Gulf, fifty miles below. An assault by the fleet on this place proved futile. A land-force was then carried across the river, which attacked and carried Port Gibson and defeated several detachments in the field. The successes thus gained rendered Grand Gulf untenable, and it was evacuated, and taken possession of by Grant's army.

It was now early May. Three months had been spent in the operations against Vicksburg, and it was still as far from capture as ever. Grant's whole army was now in the vicinity of Grand Gulf, and a new system of operations was adopted. Cutting loose from all lines of communication, he marched out into the open country, determined to subsist his army on the people, defeat all the defenders of Vicksburg in the field, and carry that place by assault from the rear. General J. E. Johnston commanded the Confederate forces in the field, and several engagements ensued, in all of which the Union army was successful. The city of Jackson was captured, and Pemberton, who marched out from Vicksburg to co-operate with Johnston, was defeated and forced to retreat to his intrenchments. Grant rapidly pursued, and on the 19th of May took possession of the outer works of the Vicksburg lines, definitely shutting the enemy within his fortifications. The important post of Haines' Bluff was taken, and communication opened with the fleet.

The campaign had lasted twenty days. In that time Grant had marched two hundred miles, beaten two armies in five successive battles, captured twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one pieces of field-artillery, taken six thousand five hundred prisoners, and killed and wounded about six thousand men. He had forced the evacuation of Grand Gulf, seized Jackson, the State capital, destroyed thirty miles of railroad, and ended by investing the strong-hold of Vicksburg. Starting with two days' rations, he had subsisted his army on the country, and reached his goal with a loss in all of four thousand three hundred and thirty-five men.

Taking it for granted that Pemberton's men were in no condition for an effective resistance, an assault was immediately made on the works, and another on the 22d, both of which were repulsed, the Union forces losing heavily. The works proving far too strong, and the approaches too difficult, for success by this method, siege-operations were determined on, and ground was broken on the 23d of May. Of the events which succeeded we select a description of the more interesting particulars from Badeau's "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant."]

GRANT had now about forty thousand men for duty, and, on the 23d, orders were given for the axe and the shovel to support the bayonet. The hot season was at hand, the troops had already endured many hardships, they were almost altogether unprovided with siege-material: so that the difficulties before the national army were not only for midable, but peculiar. The engineer organization was especially defective: there were no engineer troops in the entire command, and only four engineer officers, while twenty would have found ample opportunity for all their skills. Several pioneer companies of volunteers were, however, used for engineering purposes, and, although raw at first, became effective before the close of the siege. There were no permanent depots of siege-material; spades and picks were kept at the steamboat-landing on the Yazoo, and in the camps near the trenches; gabions and fascines were made as they were needed, by the pioneer companies, or by details of troops from the line. Grant's artillery was simply that used during the campaign, with the addition of a battery of naval guns of larger calibre, loaned him by Admiral Porter. There was nothing like a siege-train in all the West, no light mortars, and very few siege-howitzers nearer than Washington; and there was not time to send to Northern arsenals for supplies. With such material and means the siege of Vicksburg was begun.

Camps were made for the men, most of them within six hundred yards of the Confederate parapets. Stores were accumulated at the landing, and roads and covered ways opened from camp to camp.