The Capture of Philadelphia
The active military operations of the year 1777 in the North were matched by as active ones in the Middle States, though the latter did not end so successfully for the American cause. In the early part of the year, as we have seen, Washington had regained possession of New Jersey, and closed the avenue to Philadelphia by that route. Half the year was occupied by Howe in vain endeavors to bring Washington to a general engagement. Failing in this, he withdrew all his forces from New Jersey, and began extensive preparations for a sea-expedition, whose object it was not easy to ascertain. Washington, however, believed it to be the capture of Philadelphia, and made energetic preparations for the defence of that city. Howe set sail from Sandy Hook on the 23rd of July with a large and well-appointed army, leaving a strong garrison to hold New York. Rhode Island was also strongly garrisoned. Yet about this time an adventure of striking boldness occurred on that island. General Prescott, who commanded the Rhode Island forces, had become very negligent of his guard, under assurance of perfect safety. In consequence, on the 10th of July, a party of militia secretly landed on the island and carried him off prisoner from the midst of his army. This exploit gave the greatest satisfaction to the Americans, who hoped to exchange this prisoner for General Lee, who had been captured in much the same manner.
About this time several French officers of distinction entered the service of the United States, principal among them being the Marquis de Lafayette, a young nobleman of the highest rank, and for whom Washington ever afterwards felt the warmest friendship. The intentions of Howe for some time remained doubtful. His fleet kept at sea off the coast, and Washington was in doubt whether its destination was Delaware or Chesapeake Bay, or whether it might return to the Hudson or assail Charleston. The Delaware had been rendered impassable by obstructions, and all doubt was finally ended by the appearance of the fleet in the Chesapeake. It was now the last of August, the fleet having been baffled and delayed by persistent contrary winds. On the 25th of August the British army, eighteen thousand strong, landed near the head of Elk River, in Maryland. Washington, who had advanced beyond Wilmington, retreated before this superior force, and took up a position behind the Brandywine, where he designed to make a stand for the defence of Philadelphia. The story of the subsequent events we select from a well-known and valuable work on American history by an Italian author, Botta's "History of the War for Independence of the United States of America," as translated by George A. Otis.]
EARLY in the morning of the eleventh of September the British army marched to the enemy. Howe had formed his army in two columns, the right commanded by General Knyphausen, the left by Lord Cornwallis. His plan was, that while the first should make repeated feints to attempt the passage of Chadsford, in order to occupy the attention of the republicans, the second should take a long circuit to the upper part of the river, and cross at a place where it was divided into two shallow streams. . Knyphausen advanced with his column, and commenced a furious cannonade upon the passage of Chadsford, making all his dispositions as if he intended to force it. The Americans defended themselves with gallantry, and even passed several detachments of light troops to the other side, in order to harass the enemy's flanks. But after a course of skirmishes, sometimes advancing, and at others obliged to retire, they were finally, with an eager pursuit, driven over the river. Knyphausen then appeared more than ever determined to pass the ford; he stormed, and kept up an incredible noise. In this manner the attention of the Americans was fully occupied in the neighborhood of Chadsford. Meanwhile, Lord Cornwallis, at the head of the second column, took a circuitous march to the left, and gained unperceived the forks of the Brandywine. By this rapid movement he passed both branches of the river at Trimble's and at Jeffery's Fords, without opposition, about two o'clock in the afternoon, and then, turning short down the river, took the road to Dilworth, in order to fall upon the right flank of the American army. The republican general, however, received intelligence of this movement about noon, and, as it usually happens in similar cases, the reports exaggerated its importance exceedingly, it being represented that General Howe commanded this division in person. Washington therefore decided immediately for the most judicious, though boldest, measure: this was, to pass the river with the centre and left wing of his army, and overwhelm Knyphausen by the most furious attack. He justly reflected that the advantage he should obtain upon the enemy's right would amply compensate the loss that his own might sustain at the same time. Accordingly, he ordered General Sullivan to pass the Brandywine with his division at an upper ford and attack the left of Knyphausen, while he, in person, should cross lower down and fall upon the right of that general.
This operation was checked by the arrival of a new report, to the effect that the previous information was false. Washington was thus kept in uncertainty till it was too late to make any decisive movement. On learning that the enemy was really approaching in force, he hastily made preparations to meet this imminent danger.