The Army and Country after the War: Continental
In America the approach of peace, combined with other causes, produced a state of things highly interesting and critical. There was much reason to fear that Congress possessed neither the power nor the inclination to comply with its engagements to the army; and the officers who had wasted their fortunes and their prime of life in unrewarded service could not look with unconcern at the prospect which was opening to them. In December, soon after going into winter-quarters, they presented a petition to Congress, respecting the money actually due them, and the commutation of the half-pay stipulated by the resolution of October, 1780, for a sum in gross, which they flattered themselves would be less objectionable than the half-pay establishment.
There was a strong party in Congress jealous of an hostile to the demands of the army. The question of funding the public debt, whether in State or Continental securities, was also a subject of slow debate.
In consequence of these divisions on the most interesting points, the business of the army advanced slowly; and the important question regarding the commutation of their half-pay remained undecided in March, when intelligence was received of the signature of the preliminary and eventual articles of peace between the United States and Great Britain.
Soured by their past sufferings, their present wants, and their gloomy prospects, and exasperated by the neglect with which they believed themselves to be treated, and by the injustice supposed to be meditated against them, the ill-temper of the army was almost universal, and seemed to require only a slight impulse to give it activity. To render this temper the more dangerous, an opinion had been insinuated that the commander-in-chief was restrained by extreme delicacy from advocating their interests with that zeal which his feelings and knowledge of their situation had inspired. Early in March a letter was received from their committee in Philadelphia, showing that the objects they solicited had not been obtained. On the 10th of that month an anonymous paper was circulated, requiring a meeting of the general and field officers at the public building on the succeeding day at eleven in the morning.
On the same day was privately circulated an address to the army, admirably well prepared to work on the passions of the moment and to conduct them to the most desperate resolutions.
Persuaded as the officers in general were of the indisposition of government to remunerate their services, this eloquent and passionate address, dictated by genius and by feeling, found in almost every bosom a kindred though latent sentiment, prepared to receive its impression. Like a train to which a torch is applied, the passions quickly caught its flame, and nothing seemed to be required but the assemblage invited on the succeeding day to communicate the conflagration to the combustible mass, and to produce an explosion alike tremendous and ruinous.
Fortunately, the commander-in-chief was in camp. His characteristic firmness and decision did not fail him in this crisis. The occasion required that his measures should be firm, yet prudent and conciliatory; evincive of his firm determination to oppose any rash proceedings, but calculated to assuage the irritation which was excited and to restore a confidence in government. This course he at once adopted. Knowing well that it was much easier to avoid intemperate measures than to correct them, he thought it of essential importance to prevent the immediate meeting of the officers; but, knowing also that a sense of injury and fear of injustice had made a deep impression on them, and that their sensibilities were all alive to the proceedings of Congress on their memorial, he thought it more advisable to guide than to discountenance their deliberations on that interesting subject.
Washington's efforts in this direction proved successful. Though the anonymous writer circulated another insidious document on the succeeding day, the admirable address made them by the commander-in-chief powerfully impressed the officers, and drew from them a series of resolutions expressive of confidence in Congress and the country and strongly condemning the sentiments of the unknown writer. Washington then wrote to Congress, and induced that body to pass the communication resolution.
The treaty between the United States and Great Britain being eventual, it furnished no security against a continuance of the calamities of war; and the most serious fears were entertained that the difficulties opposed to a general pacification would not be removed. These fears were entirely dispelled by a letter from the Marquis de La Fayette announcing a general peace. This intelligence, though not official, was certain; and orders were immediately issued recalling all armed vessels cruising under the authority of the United States. Early in April the copy of a declaration published in Paris, and signed by the American commissioners, notifying the exchange of ratifications of the preliminary articles between Great Britain and France, was received; and the cessation of hostilities was proclaimed.
The attention of Congress might now safely be turned to the reduction of the Continental army. This was a critical operation, and, in the present state of the funds, by no means exempt from danger. Independent of the anxieties which the officers would naturally feel respecting their future provision, which of necessity remained unsecured, large arrears of pay were due to them, the immediate receipt of part of which was necessary to supply the most urgent wants. To disband an army to which the government was greatly indebted, without furnishing the means of conveying the individuals who composed it to their respective homes, could scarcely be undertaken; and Congress was unable to advance the pay of a single month.