Social Progress and Problems: Hungary and Germany

" The Spanish diplomats were busy misrepresenting our intentions and plans respecting Cuba, and stirring up the holders of Spanish bonds, especially in France and Germany, as well as other interests and influences friendly to Spain, and notably the Pope of Rome and the Emperor of Austria-Hungary, in the attempt to get sympathy and support. This produced a division between the great powers, which became sharper as the prospect increased that the future disposition of the Philippines would be determined by the impending war. Europe became very distinctly divided into two hostile camps; and, by the time the war became imminent, Great Britain was the only great power which sympathized with the United States, even Russia and France, our traditional friends, siding more or less openly with Spain, together with Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, each from mixed and different motives. But Great Britain's friendship, even though it may have been largely due to enlightened self-interest, and although it undoubtedly hurt our cause in Russia, France, and Germany, was invaluable to us in many ways; and the good understanding brought about between the two governments by Secretary Day and Ambassador Hay was a most important achievement. There was no suggestion of a formal alliance with or without a treaty, for that was at once unnecessary and undesirable under the circumstances, and the benevolent neutrality of Great Britain was much more useful. But the informal and unwritten understanding between the two governments, based on a temporary coincidence of interests and backed by popular good-will, was recognized by the other great powers as of the first importance, and at once prevented them from combining to support Spain, secured their co-operation in trying to make Spain yield, and compelled them to maintain neutrality in more or less good faith. No formal attempt was ever made to combine Europe in alliance against the United States, for the simple reason that it was well known that Great Britain would not join in such a movement, but, on the contrary, would take her stand beside the United States against any European combination."

The obvious grounds for sympathy with England are familiar,- community of language, kinship in race, similarity of institutions, fellowship in religion. Then there is the commercial argument, scarcely less familiar. She is by far our best customer.

The number of English and American families who are united by personal ties is far greater than is the case with any other two nations. We may jest about the marriages of American girls to the scions of prominent English houses; but the fact remains that these alliances, and many others that are not chronicled, have their effect. How deep may be the sentiments so earnestly uttered on both sides of the Atlantic of recent years, it is not important to inquire. The remarkable manifestations of regard that went out from every large American city on the death of Queen Victoria testified to a sincere appreciation of the blameless career of a good woman and sovereign, and the effect on the English people was profound. The aspirations of both nations are towards a union of sympathies and aims in the interests of the Anglo-Saxon race. Their lines lie in different directions, their national interests are not common, nor are they likely to be, so that any suggestion of a formal pact would be a mistake and possibly worse. Still, no well-wisher of his country, whichever it be, can contemplate the possibility of a closer friendship between these two great powers without wishing it godspeed.