Significance of the Fall of Santiago: Leo and Spain
Curiously enough, England, the European nation best able to know and understand the spirit and power of the United States, underrated the situation at first. Her naval and military authorities did not hesitate to prophesy that the Americans were sure to be victorious in the end, because, although the national spirit rose slowly, it rose surely under adversity, and was then irresistible. They were ready, however, to expect the first successes for Spain, whose standing army and excellent navy, equipped according to European standards, would be superior to the overloaded and lumbering ships of our fleet and the handful of soldiers composing our standing army, which would have to be laboriously recruited from raw volunteers, these, naturally, of the lowest classes of our population.
Even after Manila, the London Times, that recognized channel of sound conservative opinion in England, took a gloomy view of our outlook. "In time, of course," it said, "the United States will be able to bring out their immense, almost inexhaustible resources of military and naval strength, but for the moment nothing decisive can be looked for so long as Admiral Cervera's fleet is in being, and while the American army is in process of manufacture." All that had then been gained, it believed, was the knowledge that European intervention was no longer practicable.
"Intervention by the powers" was, in fact, the trump card that Spanish statesmen believed they held for use when all other resources should prove futile. It was not possible to admit that a republic of "pig-stickers," "railroad builders" and "tradesmen" would dare resist the dignified wishes of the "Concert of Europe," whose mission was the maintenance of the balance of power, the custodianship of the secrets of diplomacy by circumlocution, and the division of the estates of deceased governments among heirs to be selected for the decedent.
It was to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the Franco-Russian League that Spain looked for assistance. Great Britain was, as usual, independent of alliances, a solitary among nations, more powerful and much more feared than the United States, but yet a solitary, as we have always been.
When Congress had taken steps that left no doubt of immediate war, Spain recognized that her own diplomacy was ended. She turned immediately to Austria (whose emperor was the uncle of the queen-regent and granduncle of Alfonso XIII.), to the pope and to France. The mighty mystery of the "intervention of the powers" was thus solemnly invoked. The venerable Leo XIII., representing in his pontifical character and personal virtues the loftiest mission of religion, made overtures to the President that were acknowledged with interest and respect and replied to with open frankness of explanation. Then the aged pontiff suddenly learned that even in this effort to preserve the curious national pretence called her "honor," Spain had not hesitated to ascribe his action to the wrong initiative and to represent his motives in such a manner as to cover his high office with indignity and to reflect insult upon the United States. Overcome with grief and feeling deep humiliation, Leo XIII. withdrew, not the less respected by our government and the world that recognized his greatness of mind and nobility of purpose.
During this time, also, the powers of the continent had agreed to make united "representations" to the government of the United States through their ambassadors and ministers in a body. The note was intended to have the appearance of disinterested anxiety for peace and the effect of a menace from combined Europe, if we persisted in the determination to make war on Spain, and to destroy her sovereignty in Cuba. Italy did not join in the action.
The continent having agreed upon the plan, application was made to Great Britain to join in the remonstrance. The continent relied upon the ancient feeling of jealous dislike between England and the United States, and the recent embroilment over the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary, as causes sufficient to move the queen's ministers.
Much to Europe's surprise Great Britain declared a purpose to take no step unfriendly to Spain or the United States, which countries were presumed to be capable of managing their own affairs. But Mr. Balfour, in the premier's absence, went further and consented to an action, the significance of which the powers did not then probably fully perceive. He desired peace, but he could not interfere. He would, however, unite with the powers in presenting to the President of the United States an address expressing the hope that war might be averted, and offering friendly offices. But the nature of the address must first be communicated to the President and his consent obtained for its public presentation.
The text of the original note as determined upon by the powers is not known, but when the British ambassador at Washington entered the White House, at the head of the delegation of foreign representatives, it was notice to the world that the President had dictated the terms of the joint address and that the British ambassador presented it as the friendly and courteous suggestion of the greatest European power, and that his presence estopped the representation from being construed as a menace, upon peril of its repudiation by the British government, and the danger of provocation that might attach.